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DEHUMANIZATION, IMMIGRANTS, AND
EQUAL PROTECTION
REGINALD OH *
The process of dehumanization is an essential ingredient in the
perpetration of inhumanities. 1
Albert Bandura
We have people coming into the country, or trying to come in. We’re
stopping a lot of them. You wouldn’t believe how bad these people
are. These aren’t people, these are animals . . . .”2
President Donald Trump

INTRODUCTION
This article examines the concept of dehumanization and discusses
its relevance to the immigrant experience with invidious discrimination,
and to equal protection doctrine. It contends that immigrants, including
undocumented immigrants, require special judicial protection under
equal protection due to their history of, and susceptibility to,
dehumanization.
The equal protection suspect class doctrine has categorized racial
and ethnic minorities, women, nonmarital children, and immigrants as
politically vulnerable suspect classes.
Accordingly, laws
* Reginald Oh is Professor of Law at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law,
Cleveland State University. He teaches constitutional law, civil procedure, and legal
ethics. His scholarship focuses on the meaning of racial equality under the Fourteenth
Amendment. He received his J.D. from Boston College Law School and his LL.M.
from Georgetown University Law Center.
1. Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities,
3 PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 193, 200 (1999) [hereinafter Moral
Disengagement].
2. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Calls Some Unauthorized Immigrants
‘Animals’ in Rant, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/05/16/us/politics/trump-undocumented-immigrants-animals.html.

103

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,

1

California Western Law Review, Vol. 56 [], No. 1, Art. 14
Oh camera ready FINAL (Do Not Delete)

104

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

1/22/2020 11:46 AM

[Vol. 56

discriminating against these suspect classes are subject to rigorous
judicial review. Courts will apply either strict or intermediate scrutiny
and require the government to have a strong justification for the
discrimination. A law discriminating against a class that is not
considered suspect will be subject to deferential rational basis review
and the government will only need to show the discrimination serves
some legitimate government interest for the law to be upheld.
The United States Supreme Court has, in a line of cases, relied on
a set of suspect class factors to decide which classes or social groups
are suspect. These factors include whether a class: (1) has suffered a
history of discrimination; (2) is politically powerless; (3) is defined by
an immutable trait; (4) is defined by a highly visible trait; and (5) is
defined by an irrelevant trait.
However, legal commenters have criticized the suspect class
analysis for lacking coherence. The Court has not fully fleshed out the
meaning of the various factors. Neither has it explained whether all or
just some of the factors need to be met for a class to be suspect, nor has
it explained whether some factors are more important than others. It is
not entirely clear what exactly the factors aim to prove or establish.
This article contends the concept of dehumanization can help bring
clarity to the suspect class doctrine. Dehumanization is the process by
which a class of people is treated as less than human or as subhuman.
Dehumanization denies that the dehumanized group possesses traits
unique to humans, such as the ability to think critically or feel
emotions. 3 Dehumanizing treatment is a key step in governmental
infliction of abuse, atrocities, and harm against the dehumanized group,
making it a central process in the subordination of a marginalized
group.
This article argues the suspect class factors laid out by the Supreme
Court are, at least implicitly, intended to determine if a social group is
susceptible to dehumanization, consequently making them susceptible
to invidious discrimination.
Incorporating the concept of
dehumanization into suspect class analysis will help explain why
immigrants, especially undocumented immigrants, should be
considered suspect and, therefore, afforded special judicial protection.

3. See Stephen M. Utych, How Dehumanization Influences Attitudes Towards
Immigrants, 1 POL. RES. Q. 19 (2017).
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This article is divided into three parts. Part I explores the concept
of dehumanization and its central role in the subordination of
marginalized groups. Part II discusses the equal protection doctrine of
suspect classes by analyzing key decisions by the Court and its
reasoning for whether or not to consider a particular group as a suspect
class. Part II also argues that the decision in Brown v. Board of
Education regards racial segregation in public schools as a form of
racial dehumanization and provides the doctrinal basis to consider
dehumanization a central factor in determining suspect class status.
Part III contends that the experience immigrants have with pervasive
dehumanization, in both the past and the present, strongly justifies their
designation as a suspect class. Moreover, it argues if dehumanization
is indeed a central concern of the suspect class doctrine, then
undocumented immigrants should be afforded suspect status.
I. DEHUMANIZATION
Dehumanization is the process by which people are understood to
be less than human. 4 Typically, a group is dehumanized through
language or imagery depicting them as animalistic or subhuman.
Dehumanization encompasses two layers. One layer involves stripping
a person, or class of persons, of human qualities, such as emotions and
cognitive abilities. 5 The second layer involves “attributing demonic or
bestial qualities to them.” 6 The two layers combine to turn a
dehumanized person into something less than human, something even
akin to a subhuman, animalistic creature. 7
4. DAVID LIVINGSTONE SMITH, LESS THAN HUMAN: WHY WE DEMEAN,
ENSLAVE, AND EXTERMINATE OTHERS 26 (2011). There is a growing body of social
psychology literature studying dehumanization and its effects. See generally Vera
Katelyn Wilde et al., Dehumanization as a Distinct Form of Prejudice, 21 TPM 301,
302 (2014); Nick Haslam, Dehumanization: An Integrative Review, 10 PERSONALITY
AND SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 252 (2006); Phillip Atiba Goff & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Not
Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical Dehumanization, and Contemporary
Consequences, 94 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 292, 293 (2008).
5. See Nour Kteily et al., The Ascent of Man: Theoretical and Empirical
Evidence for Blatant Dehumanization, J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 3–4
(2015).
6. Albert Bandura, Selective Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral
Agency, 31 J. OF MORAL EDUC. 101, 109 (2002).
7. Kteily et al., supra note 5, at 3.
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For social psychologist Albert Bandura, “The process of
dehumanization is an essential ingredient in the perpetration of
inhumanities.” 8 Dehumanization plays a paramount role in the
marginalization of certain groups, as “conceiving of people as
subhuman often makes them objects of violence and victims of
degradation.” 9
How does dehumanization lead people to inflict harm or support
punitive policies against a class of people? One factor is the attitudes
of the person or group engaging in dehumanization. When a group
views a specific class of people as subhuman, these outgroups are
placed “outside of normal moral consideration,” which then
“facilitate[s] violence against the dehumanized group.” 10 According to
Herbert Kelman, “[t]o the extent victims are dehumanized, principles
of morality no longer apply to them and moral restraints are more
readily overcome.” 11 The ability to restrain oneself from engaging in
cruel conduct against another person is severely diminished once the
victim is stripped of human qualities. 12
Dehumanizing a group also elicits negative emotions, such as
anger, disgust, and fear against the dehumanized group. 13 Those
negative emotions can lead to reduced empathy for the dehumanized
group and support the desire for harsh, punitive treatment.
A. The Dehumanization of Jews and African Americans
Historically, dehumanization was integral to the atrocities inflicted
upon marginalized classes in society. For example, dehumanization
played a crucial part in the genocidal campaign against Jews during
World War II, and to the enslavement of persons of African descent in
the United States.
In Nazi Germany, those who were Jewish were dehumanized as an
insidious, subhuman race of people who possessed the qualities of

8. Moral Disengagement, supra note 1, at 200.
9. SMITH, supra note 4, at 37.
10. Kteily et al., supra note 5, at 902.
11. H.C. Kelman, Violence Without Moral Restraint: Reflections on the
Dehumanization of Victims and Victimizers, 29 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 24, 48 (1973).
12. Moral Disengagement, supra note 1, at 200.
13. See Utych, supra note 3, at 2.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol56/iss1/14

4

Oh: Dehumanization, Immigrants, and Equal Protection
Oh camera ready FINAL (Do Not Delete)

1/22/2020 11:46 AM

2019] DEHUMANIZATION, IMMIGRANTS, AND EQUAL PROTECTION 107
disease and vermin. 14 Adolf Hitler believed Jewish people were an
“illness spreading parasite, representing the danger of disease.” 15 He
considered them as a “germ, germ carrier, or agent of disease, a
decomposing agent, fungus, or maggot.” 16 He referred to Jews as
“bloodsuckers, leeches, and poisonous parasites.” 17 Joseph Goebbels,
in a Nazi propaganda film he produced entitled The Eternal Jew,
connected “Jews and filth, decay, and disease in every sector of cultural
life. The film’s narrator gravely states the ‘race of parasites’ has no
feeling for the ‘purity and cleanliness’ of the German idea of art.” 18 A
campaign of genocide seemed entirely rational, logical, and necessary
to the Nazis once Jews were dehumanized as vermin and disease.
Similarly, dehumanization was at the heart of African and African
American experiences with slavery and segregation in the United
States. 19 American slaveholders justified the enslavement of Africans
by contending that they were animalistic subhumans. 20 If Africans
were not really human, then enslaving them did not constitute a
violation of human rights. Thus, slavery apologists believed that
Africans could be “tamed, trained and used like domestic
animals . . . .” 21
Even after the abolishment of slavery, African Americans
continued to be dehumanized. Immediately after slavery was
abolished, former slave states enacted the Black Codes, 22 replicating
through state law a system of discriminatory treatment depriving
African Americans of basic liberties. After the Fourteenth Amendment
abolished the Black Codes, former slave states implemented Jim Crow

14. SMITH, supra note 4, at 146.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 139.
19. See id. at 114–23 (describing dehumanization of Africans).
20. Id. at 117 (“Many colonists treated slaves as less than human and also
explicitly stated that Africans were soulless animals.”).
21. Id. at 119.
22. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW: A
COMMEMORATIVE EDITION 23 (2002).
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segregation to dehumanize African Americans. 23 Like slavery, Jim
Crow laws were a legal manifestation of the entrenched belief that
African Americans were inferior subhumans who could not share
spaces with whites. 24
The tragic story of Ota Benga, a member of the African pygmy
group from central Africa, illustrates the horrors of dehumanization. In
the early 20th century, a white American arranged for Ota Benga to
move from Africa to the United States to become an attraction at the
Bronx Zoo in New York. 25 Ota Benga was put in a cage as if he was
an animal. In fact, they made him share his cage with an orangutan. 26
The New York Times reported on Ota Benga, stating, “‘[f]ew expressed
audible objection to the sight of a human being in a cage with monkeys
as companions.’” 27
The treatment of Ota Benga incited an uproar among the local
African American community. Under mounting social pressure, the
Bronx Zoo ultimately released Ota Benga from his cage. However, he
remained at the zoo and continued to be treated as an attraction.
Thousands of visitors came to see “the star attraction in the park, the
wild man from Africa. They chased him about the grounds all day,
howling, jeering, and yelling” before Ota Benga ultimately committed
suicide. 28
B. The Dehumanization of Immigrants in the United States
Throughout American history, dehumanization went hand in hand
with invidious discrimination towards immigrants of all races, though
especially immigrants of color. Americans in the 19th and 20th centuries
described Asian immigrants as a “yellow peril,” a faceless horde of
homogeneous and “unassimilable” aliens who posed an existential
23. See JERROLD M. PACKARD, AMERICAN NIGHTMARE: THE HISTORY OF JIM
CROW 65 (2002) (“From the end of Reconstruction until the Supreme Court’s Plessy
v. Ferguson decision in 1896, Jim Crow spread like a pestilence.”).
24. See id. at 64 (“But Jim Crow was a Southern phenomenon, the infrastructure
white Southerners built to preserve, insofar as humanly possible, the old master/slave
system.”).
25. SMITH, supra note 4, at 121.
26. Id. at 122.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 123.
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threat to American society. 29 Chinese immigrant men in the late 19th
century were dehumanized as drug addicts whose very presence
fostered prostitution, gambling, and other immoral activities. 30
Japanese immigrants took on the label of a dehumanized yellow peril
in the early 20th century. 31
The relentless dehumanization of Asian immigrants inevitably led
to violence. Over 150 anti-Chinese riots occurred in the American west
during the 1870s and 1880s. 32 In 1884, a judge in Texas dismissed a
murder charge against a white man accused of killing a Chinese
immigrant, ruling that he could not find a “law against killing a
Chinaman because the law in Texas came down only to killing human
beings.” 33
Some white European immigrants also suffered from
dehumanization upon their arrival to the United States, particularly Irish
and Italian immigrants. During the mid-19th century, Irish immigrants
were “depicted as subhuman. They were the carrier of disease. They
were drawn as lazy, clannish, unclean drunken brawlers who wallowed
in crime and bred like rats.” 34 In an 1881 British political cartoon, an
Irish American immigrant was depicted as a grotesque animal-like
creature dubbed the “Wild Beast” and “Dynamite Skunk.” 35 In the

29. See Yvonne Walter, Asian Americans and American Immigration and
Naturalization Policy, 49 AM. STUD. J. (2007), http://www.asjournal.org/492007/asian-americans-and-american-immigration-and-naturalization-policy/.
30. Gwen Sharp, Old “Yellow Peril” Anti-Chinese Propaganda, SOC’Y PAGES
(June 20, 2014),
https://thesocietypages.org/socimages/2014/06/20/old-yellow-peril-anti-chineseposters/.
31. See Devon Carbado, Yellow by Law, 97 CAL. L. REV. 633, 640 (2009).
32. Braden Goyette, How Racism Created America’s Chinatowns, HUFFPOST
(Nov.
11,
2014),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/american-chinatownshistory_n_6090692.
33. Chinese Railroad Workers in North America Project, Timeline, STANFORD
UNIV. https://web.stanford.edu/group/chineserailroad/cgi-bin/website/timeline/ (last
visited Nov. 17, 2019).
34. Douglas Kierdorf, Getting to Know the Know-Nothings, BOS. GLOBE (Jan.
10, 2019), https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2016/01/10/getting-know-knownothings/yAojakXKkiauKCAzsf4WAL/story.html?outputType=amp.
35. Kevin Kenny, Irish Immigrant Stereotypes and American Racism, AM. SOC.
HISTORY PROJECT CTR. FOR MEDIA AND LEARNING: PICTURING U.S. HISTORY,
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cartoon, the “Wild Beast” is locked up in a cage, has “diabolical ears
and feet,” and an “extraordinary tail.” 36 American political cartoonists
depicted Irish immigrants as “Celtic ape-men with sloping foreheads
and monstrous appearances.” 37 Those cartoons reflected the view that
Irish immigrants were closer to apes than to humans. 38
Americans, fueled by the belief that “Irish immigrant depravity”
made them “inherently violent, savage by nature,” 39 discriminated
against the Irish in employment, physically attacked them, and
supported harsh, punitive, anti-immigrant policies. 40 In Massachusetts,
when the anti-immigrant “Know-Nothing Party” gained control of the
state legislature, they immediately deported three hundred Irish
immigrants believing they were a drain on public resources.41
Additionally, the state prohibited naturalized citizens from voting
unless they had been in the United States for twenty-one years—further
impacting the Irish immigrant. 42
In August of 1855, in Louisville, Kentucky, the infamous “Bloody
Monday” took place on an election day when armed members of the
“Know-Nothing Party” engaged Irish and German immigrants in street
fights and ransacked and set fire to their homes. 43 More than twenty
Irish and German immigrants were killed, and thousands were forced
to leave the city.
Italian immigrants were similarly dehumanized in the late 19th and
early 20th centuries. A New Orleans newspaper described them as “a
pest without mitigation. Our own rattlesnakes are as good citizens as
they.” 44 The editorial went on to conclude lynching was the only way
https://picturinghistory.gc.cuny.edu/irish-immigrant-stereotypes-and-americanracism/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2019).
36. Id.
37. Christopher Klein, When America Despised the Irish: The 19th Century’s
Refugee Crisis, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/news/when-america-despisedthe-irish-the-19th-centurys-refugee-crisis (last visited Nov. 18, 2019).
38. Kenny, supra note 35.
39. Id.
40. Klein, supra note 37.
41. Kierdorf, supra note 34.
42. Klein, supra note 37.
43. Id.
44. Christopher Woolf, A Brief History of America’s Hostility to a Previous
Generation of Mediterranean Migrants-Italians, PRI (Nov. 26, 2015),
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to stop Italian immigrants from committing crimes. 45 Moreover, an
author of a 1907 book commenting on Italian immigrants stated that
“immigrants from eastern and southern Europe are storming the Nordic
parts of the United States and mongrelizing the good old American
stock.” 46 On March 14, 1891, in one of the worst lynchings in U.S.
history, eleven Italian immigrant men were killed by those seeking
vengeance for a police officer who had been murdered—allegedly by
an Italian immigrant. 47
These are just a few historical examples of the inhumanity
immigrants from all over the world encountered following their
immigration to the United States. Unfortunately, the ugly legacy of
dehumanizing immigrants has not been relegated to the past. It is still
alive today.
C. The Dehumanization of Immigrants in the Present
The dehumanization of immigrants is pervasive in American
political culture, as it has gone hand-in-hand with support for, and
enactment of, punitive anti-immigration policies. President Donald
Trump has been a catalyst for the increase in volume and intensity of
the dehumanizing rhetoric about immigrants. Trump’s dehumanizing
of immigrants was central to his winning the 2016 presidential election.
Throughout his presidential campaign in 2015 and 2016, Trump
referred to Latino immigrants as criminals, rapists, animals, and disease
carriers. 48 In a 2015 campaign speech, he called Latino immigrants
entering the United States a “tremendous infectious disease,” and
claimed that they were “pouring across the border.” 49 He also talked

https://www.pri.org/stories/2015-11-26/brief-history-america-s-hostility-previousgeneration-mediterranean-migrants.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Katie Reilly, Here Are All the Times Donald Trump Insulted Mexico, TIME
(Aug. 31, 2016),
https://time.com/4473972/donald-trump-mexico-meeting-insult/.
49. Rupert Neate & Jo Tuckerman, Donald Trump: Mexican Migrants Bring
‘Tremendous Infectious Disease’ to US, GUARDIAN (July 6, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/06/donald-trump-mexicanimmigrants-tremendous-infectious-disease.
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about how undocumented immigrants “roam” the United States as if
they are predatory animals: “Nearly 180,000 illegal immigrants with
criminal records. . .are roaming free to threaten peaceful citizens.” 50
President Trump has only continued to dehumanize immigrants
since taking office. He continues to refer to immigrants as infestation
and disease, claiming that Democrats want “illegal immigrants, no
matter how bad they may be, to pour into and infest our country.”51
Trump has referred to Latino immigrants, and, specifically, to Latino
gang members as predatory animals. In one speech, he described Latino
immigrants in this manner, stating “You’ve seen the stories about some
of these animals. They don’t want to use guns because it’s too fast and
it’s not painful enough. So, they’ll take a young, beautiful girl, 16, 15
and others, and they slice them and dice them with a knife because they
want them to go through excruciating pain before they die.” 52
Trump’s administration has followed suit in sharing his
dehumanizing rhetoric. Former White House Press Secretary Sarah
Sanders agreed with Trump’s characterization of Latino gang members,
stating, “It took an animal to stab a man 100 times and decapitate him
and rip his heart out,” when referring to a murder allegedly committed
by a Latino immigrant MS-13 gang member. 53 She added, “Frankly I
think the term animal doesn’t go far enough” and that Trump needs to
do everything to stop “these types of horrible, horrible disgusting
people.” 54
50. Miriam Valverde, Trump: Nearly ‘180,000 Illegal Immigrants’ Have
Criminal Records but Haven’t Been Deported, POLITIFACT (July 22, 2016, 2:36 AM),
https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/jul/22/donaldtrump/trump-nearly-180000-illegal-immigrants-have-crimin/.
51. Trump: Immigrants Are Threatening to ‘Infest’ U.S., DAILY BEAST (June
19, 2018), https://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-immigrants-are-threatening-toinfest-us.
52. Maya Oppenheim, Donald Trump Brands Illegal Immigrant Gang Members
‘Animals’ Who ‘Slice and Dice’ Young Beautiful Girls, INDEPENDENT (July 26, 2017,
3:45 PM),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/donald-trump-illegalimmigrants-animals-slice-dice-young-beautiful-girls-us-president-a7861596.html.
53. Gaby Morrongiello, Not ‘Strong Enough’: Sarah Sanders Defends Trump
Comments About Violent Illegal Immigrants, WASH. EXAM’R (May 17, 2018, 2:10
PM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/white-house/not-strong-enoughsanders-defends-trump-comments-about-violent-illegal-immigrants.
54. Id.
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These characterizations of Latino immigrants dehumanize them
and perpetuate Trump’s narrative that they are less than human.
D. Empirical Studies of Dehumanization
President Trump does not dehumanize immigrants simply for the
sake of dehumanizing them. He dehumanizes them to catalyze public
support for harsh, punitive, anti-immigrant policies, doing so whether
the policies concern mass deportations, detention of asylum-seekers,
separation of migrant children from their parents, termination of
Temporary Protective Status for Haitian immigrants, or termination of
the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program.
Social science studies confirm the connection between
dehumanization and subsequent implementation of punitive policies
and infliction of physical harm against a dehumanized group. 55 In a
classic study by Stanford psychologist Albert Bandura, college students
were assigned to selectively administer electric shocks to a group of
individuals under their supervision. 56 The groups were described in
three distinct ways to the students: humanized, dehumanized, or
neutral. 57 The experiment found that the students aggressively
administered electric shocks to the dehumanized. 58 According to
Bandura, “Dehumanized performers were treated more than twice as
punitively as those invested with human qualities and considerably
more severely than the neutral group.” 59 Moreover, “[u]nder
dysfunctional feedback, the subjects suddenly escalated punitiveness
toward dehumanized performers to near maximum intensities.” 60 In
other words, when it became clear to the students that administering
shocks to the dehumanized subjects did not improve performance, the
students became even more punitive. 61 Students who supervised
dehumanized subjects engaged in arbitrary and irrational infliction of
55. See, e.g., Albert Bandura, Disinhibition of Aggression Through Diffusion of
Responsibility and Dehumanization of Victims, 9 J. OF RES. PERSONALITY 253 (1975)
[hereinafter Disinhibition].
56. Id. at 256.
57. Id. at 258.
58. SMITH, supra note 4, at 130.
59. Disinhibition, supra note 55, at 266.
60. Id.
61. See id.
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harm, 62 demonstrating that dehumanization is a “potent predictor of
aggressive intergroup attitudes and behavior toward marginalized
groups in the United States.” 63
Another study from 2017 found dehumanizing Mexican
immigrants went hand-in-hand with support for anti-immigration
policies, even “controlling for levels of political conservatism and
prejudice.” 64 In this way, dehumanization predicted support for antiimmigrant policies more so than political conservatism or prejudice
toward Mexican immigrants. People who dehumanized immigrants
were more likely to think of them “in threatening terms, withhold
sympathy from them, and support measures designed to send and keep
them out such as surveillance, detention, expulsion, and building a wall
between the United States and Mexico.” 65 Importantly, the study also
showed that dehumanization leads to support for punitive government
policies. 66 The study found people who had dehumanizing beliefs
about Mexican immigrants were likely to sign petitions favoring
punitive policies against them. 67
A third study from 2015 further examined this relationship between
the dehumanization of undocumented immigrants and support for
punitive anti-immigrant policies. 68
Individuals were randomly
assigned to two groups. One group read text describing undocumented
immigrants in a negative, but non-dehumanizing manner:
I understand that immigration has become a controversial issue these
days. However, the movement of immigrants across our border must
be controlled. Our nation is negatively impacted by illegal
immigration; this situation is getting worse, not better. Some have
suggested amnesty as a solution; I believe this is a solution that just

62. See id. at 267 (“subjects escalated their punitiveness with dehumanized
performers”).
63. Nour Kteilly & Emile Bruneau, Backlash: The Politics and Real-World
Consequences of Minority Group Dehumanization, 43 PERSONALITY AND SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 87, 93 (2017).
64. Id. at 90.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 90 (“blatant dehumanization of Mexican immigrants was uniquely
associated with more support for the anti-immigration statements and policies . . .”).
67. Id. at 91.
68. Utych, supra note 3, at 5.
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exacerbates the problem. Offering amnesty will not end the problem
of illegal immigration-it will only make our country let in more
immigrants. We have to address this problem at its location. Only
increased border security and deportation will serve to control the
danger of illegal immigration. 69

The other group read text discussing the same issue but using
dehumanizing language:
I understand that immigration has become a toxic issue these days.
However, the transmission of immigrants across our border must be
contained. The body of our nation is plagued by illegal immigration;
this disease is getting worse, not better. Some have suggested
amnesty as a cure; I believe this is a remedy that kills the patient.
Offering amnesty will not eradicate the problem of illegal
immigration-it will only make our country absorb more immigrants.
We have to attack this problem at its nucleus. Only increased border
security and deportation will serve to quarantine the poison of illegal
immigration. 70

Afterwards, the participants were asked about immigration policies.71
Those who read the dehumanizing text were significantly less likely to
support an increase in legal immigration, significantly more likely to
support border security measures, and significantly less likely to
support granting undocumented immigrants a path to citizenship. 72
In addition, the study showed that reading dehumanizing text about
immigrants elicited negative emotions in the participants. 73 Those who
read the dehumanizing text were angrier and more disgusted by
immigrants than those who read the non-dehumanizing text. 74 Not
surprisingly, those who expressed anger and disgust favored more
restrictive immigration policies, such as restricting the number of
immigrants permitted to enter the country, increased border security,

69. Id. at 17.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 4.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 7.
74. Id. at 6 (“dehumanization leads to higher reported feelings of both anger and
disgust”).
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and denying any path to legal status. 75 Feelings of anger against
immigrants led to support for punitive policies (detention and
deportation), while feelings of disgust led to support for policies of
avoidance and protection (border wall). 76 The study concluded that
dehumanizing immigrants (with language likening them to disease and
contagion) influenced “attitudes towards immigrants directly by
causing more negative attitudes towards immigrants, and indirectly by
increasing self-reported levels of disgust towards immigrants.” 77
II. THE DOCTRINE OF SUSPECT CLASSES
The concept of dehumanization has implications for law. Under
the equal protection doctrine of suspect classes, a law is subject to
heightened scrutiny only if it operates to the disadvantage of a suspect
class. 78 Racial and ethnic minorities, women, illegitimate children, and
immigrants have been deemed suspect, vulnerable groups that deserve
special constitutional protection. 79 Laws that discriminate against
suspect classes are subject to heightened judicial review such as strict
or intermediate scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny, the government must
have a very strong justification for the discrimination. 80 If it does not,
the law will be deemed unconstitutional and struck down. 81 Strict
scrutiny review establishes a very high standard to meet for a law to be
upheld; therefore, when reviewed using this standard, a law is likely to
be struck down. 82 If a group is not considered a protected class,
heightened constitutional protection under strict scrutiny is not afforded

75. See id. at 5 (“dehumanization increases feelings of disgust, which in turn
decreases the likelihood of an individual having pro-immigrant attitudes”).
76. See id. at 8 (“disgust may trigger protectionist policies, such as increased
barriers to entry or removal from the country of immigrants, while anger may lead to
more confrontational policy preferences, such as incarceration or even violence”).
77. Id. at 5.
78. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (“[W]e have treated as
presumptively invidious those classifications that disadvantage a ‘suspect class’ . . .”).
79. See Thomas W. Simon, Suspect Class Democracy: A Social Theory, 45 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 107, 132 (1990).
80. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (under strict scrutiny,
only laws narrowly tailored to serve compelling interest will be found constitutional).
81. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
82. See id.
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to them. 83 Laws discriminating against that group will generally be
reviewed, and are likely to be upheld, under the rational basis test. 84
The suspect class theory of equal protection originates from the
theory of judicial review explicated in United States v. Carolene
Products Footnote Four. 85 Based on the Carolene Products theory,
courts would strictly scrutinize legislatively enacted “suspect
classifications” that burdened the rights of a vulnerable group or a
“suspect class.” 86 A social group will be considered “suspect” if it
suffers from the traditional indicia of “suspectness:” 87 whether a class
is saddled with disabilities, whether it has been subject to a history of
unequal treatment, whether the group has been relegated to “position[s]
of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from
the majoritarian political process.” 88 If a group fails to meet the
traditional indicia of “suspectness,” the group will be considered a nonsuspect class, and laws discriminating against them will be subject to
deferential rational basis review. 89
The suspect class doctrine has been subject to voluminous analysis
and criticism. 90 Commentators argue the Court has failed to apply its
83. Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976).
84. See San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973) (a law subject to
rational basis upheld as long as it’s “shown to bear some rational relationship to
legitimate state purposes”).
85. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. at 152–53 n.4 (1938); see
generally Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of
Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1290–1309 (1982) (analyzing Footnote Four’s theory
of judicial review).
86. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216–17 (“With respect to such classifications, it is
appropriate to enforce the mandate of equal protection by requiring the State to
demonstrate that its classification has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest.”).
87. See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313.
88. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
89. See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313–14.
90. See, e.g., Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 135 (2011); Richard E. Levy, Political Process and Individual Fairness
Rationales in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Suspect Classification Jurisprudence, 50
WASHBURN L.J. 33 (2010); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Not Without Political
Power”: Gays and Lesbians, Equal Protection and the Suspect Class Doctrine, 65
ALA. L. REV. 975 (2014) [hereinafter Political Power]; Darren Lenard Hutchinson,
“Unexplainable on Grounds Other than Race”: The Inversion of Privilege and
Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615; Kenji
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suspect class analysis in a consistent and coherent manner. 91 They also
contend the Court has failed to adequately explain the meaning, nature,
and importance of the various suspect class factors it has developed to
determine if a social group deserves special judicial protection. 92
For example, the Court has yet to adequately explain the
immutability factor. Commentators argue immutability should not be
dispositive in determining if a class should be deemed suspect, and,
arguably, it is truly not even relevant at all. 93 Specifically, there is
considerable debate over whether sexual orientation is an immutable
trait, 94 meaning whether it is a “permanent state, unalterably imprinted
in the fixed order of creation.” 95 However, because there is no question
that members of the LGBT community have experienced—and
continue to experience—invidious discrimination, their need for special
judicial protection should not depend on whether or not sexual
orientation is immutable.
The concept of dehumanization could provide some coherence to
the Court’s suspect class analysis. The Court’s suspect class factors
make more sense when understood as the Court’s attempt to establish
criteria to identify social groups that are susceptible to dehumanization.
A group susceptible to dehumanization is a group that is vulnerable to
invidious discrimination by the political majority, thus requiring
heightened judicial protection. The Court has never explicitly analyzed
its suspect class factors through the lens of dehumanization but an

Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and
the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE. L.J. 485 (1998).
91. See Political Power, supra note 90, at 978 (suspect class doctrine is
“inconsistently applied”).
92. See id.
93. See Strauss, supra note 90, at 165 (“Immutability suffers from the same
flaws as the other factors—it is imprecisely and inconsistently defined by the
courts.”).
94. See id. at 161–62.
95. William Brennan, Female Objects of Semantic Dehumanization and
15
(1995)
(available
at
Violence,
STUD. PRO LIFE FEMINISM
https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Female+objects+of+semantic+dehumanization+and
+violence.-a095580037).
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analysis of the Court’s suspect class cases suggests that, at least
implicitly, concern about dehumanization has been present. 96
A. Racial Minorities, Brown v. Board of Education,
and Dehumanization
Any examination of the equal protection suspect class doctrine
must begin with an examination of Brown v. Board of Education.97
Although the Court in Brown did not use suspect class language in
determining that racial segregation in the schools denies African
Americans equal protection, Brown is the paradigmatic case involving
a vulnerable class in need of special judicial protection.
In Brown v. Board of Education, the Court examined the
constitutionality of state-imposed racial segregation in public schools.98
It declared that such segregation violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause, overruling Plessy v. Ferguson and abolishing
the doctrine of “separate, but equal.” 99 In Plessy, the Court had upheld
state racial segregation laws as long as they provided for separate but
equal facilities. 100 Under Plessy’s separate but equal doctrine, racially
segregated schools were constitutional as long as white and black
schools were equal in terms of tangible factors, such as the quality of
physical facilities. 101 However, in Brown, the Court rejected the
application of the Plessy doctrine, reasoning that schools with equal
tangible factors may not truly be equal for purposes of equal
protection. 102 The Court further explained:
[t]here are findings below that the Negro and white schools involved
have been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to
buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other

96. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (expressing
concern that racial segregation generates feelings of inferiority in black
schoolchildren).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 493.
99. Id. at 495.
100. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
101. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635–36 (1950) (holding black law
school unconstitutional because it was separate but unequal to white law school).
102. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
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‘tangible’ factors. Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a
comparison of these tangible factors in the Negro and white schools
involved in each of these cases. We must look instead to the effects
of segregation on public education. 103

The Court concluded that, “[t]o separate children from others of similar
age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling
of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.” 104 Thus, the
Court held the racial segregation of public schools violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 105
The Court’s holding and reasoning in Brown supports the claim that
dehumanization is, and should be, considered a central concern for
equal protection analysis. Brown can be viewed as a case about
dehumanization achieved through discrimination and segregation.
Segregation instilled a sense of inferiority in black schoolchildren
because its underlying premise was the innate inferiority of blacks.
Whites believed African Americans were “mentally inferior, physically
and culturally unevolved, and apelike in appearance.” 106 They believed
that, as a matter of biology, blacks “occupied the lowest position of the
evolutionary scale.” 107 Segregation’s key function was to
institutionalize the dehumanization of African American students,
which explains why “separate” in the context of Jim Crow was
inherently unequal.
Brown implicitly provides the reasoning to support the designation
of marginalized racial groups as a suspect class. All the suspect class
factors are present with respect to African Americans. First, African
Americans are defined by race, an immutable or fixed trait. Second,
that trait is highly visible and gives a racial group, such as African
Americans, distinctive, identifiable features. Third, that trait is
irrelevant to defining a person’s abilities. Fourth, African Americans
have suffered from a history of discrimination. Fifth, African
Americans experience political powerlessness that makes them
103. Id. at 492.
104. Id. at 494.
105. Id. at 495.
106. S. Plous & Tyrone Williams, Racial Stereotypes from the Days of
American Slavery: A Continuing Legacy, 25 J. APP. SOC. PSYCHOL. 795, 795 (1995).
107. Id.
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deserving of special judicial protection from the majoritarian political
process.
What ties all the suspect class factors is dehumanization. The
suspect traits were the basis upon which African Americans
experienced systematic dehumanization which led to their enslavement
and then segregation under Jim Crow. Their highly visible and fixed
trait, race, was the basis for their dehumanization and consequent
subjugation. Their supposed inferiority to whites and their supposed
subhuman nature flowed from their race. In this way, the suspect class
factors can be understood as a proxy for susceptibility to
dehumanization.
B. Women as a Suspect Class
The United States Supreme Court concluded women are a suspect
class because their experience bore similarities to the experience of
African Americans. In Frontiero v. Richardson, the Court held that
gender is a suspect classification and treated women as a suspect class
deserving of special judicial protection. 108 Underlying the Court’s
analysis is a concern about the dehumanization of women. The Court
noted, “our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex
discrimination.” 109 That discrimination was based on paternalistic
beliefs that “put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.” 110 Those
beliefs also led men to invidiously discriminate against women in a
manner akin to the experience of African Americans. Like slaves,
women historically could not “hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit
in their own names.” 111 Women who married lost their individual legal
rights upon entering into the marriage. Married women could not own
or convey property or even serve as legal guardians for their children. 112
The Court could have strengthened its argument for women as a
suspect class by elaborating on why women experienced pervasive
discrimination in greater depth. Our patriarchal society structured
gender relations on dehumanizing beliefs about women. They could

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).
Id. at 684.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 685.
Id.
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not vote because women were believed to lack the mental capacity to
vote in a rational, informed manner. Unlike men, women were
considered intrinsically irrational, driven by emotions rather than
reason. 113 According to an anti-suffragist, “[t]he female vote . . . is
always more impulsive and less subject to reason, and almost devoid of
the sense of responsibility.” 114 The view of the unstable female mind
put women on the same level as “paupers, felons, and so-called idiots,”
classes who also were denied the right to vote. 115
According to anti-suffragists, if women were allowed to vote, they
would eventually take on masculine roles, which would lead to the
creation of a “race of masculine women and effeminate men and the
mating of these would result in the procreation of a race of
degenerates.” 116 In other words, women would go against their true,
inferior nature by trying to emulate men and would then become
“degenerate,” “masculine” women who would inevitably give birth to
“degenerates.” 117
When women are viewed as inferior, it is inferior in a dehumanized
sense. Women’s inferiority is a “totalistic notion encompassing almost
every aspect of the woman’s being—physical, mental, and
emotional.” 118 Moreover, women’s inferiority is something intrinsic
and immutable.
In Frontiero v. Richardson, the Court ultimately concluded that
gender classifications must be treated as suspect because they have “the
effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior
legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual
members.” 119 Understanding the role that dehumanization plays in this
invidious relegation helps to bolster the Court’s reasoning.

113. Cynthia Crossen, Even Women Didn’t Want to Give Women the Vote,
WALL STREET J. (Mar. 5, 2003, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB1046817919602413840.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Brennan, supra note 95, at 4.
119. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 687.
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C. The Intellectually Disabled as an Implicit Suspect Class
The Court has not, technically, held that the intellectually disabled
are a suspect class. However, in Cleburne v. Cleburne, the Court
arguably did so covertly. 120 To invalidate a zoning restriction that
discriminated against the intellectually disabled, the Court applied
“rational basis with bite” review. 121 The Court’s reasoning suggests
that, in striking down the zoning permit requirement, it was concerned
with the dehumanization of the intellectually disabled. 122 Relying on
precedent, the Court discussed at length the rationale for treating certain
traits like race, national origin, alienage, gender, and illegitimacy as
suspect. 123 In explaining the “suspect” nature of racial, alienage, and
gender classifications, the Court found those traits are “so seldom
relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws
grounded in such consideration are deemed to reflect prejudice and
antipathy – a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or
deserving as others.” 124 In reasoning as such, the Court spoke the
language of dehumanization.
Additionally, the Court explained that the recognized suspect class
traits are suspect because they “frequently bear no relation to ability to
perform or contribute to society.” 125 The Court stated that a suspect
trait like sex does not reflect a person’s abilities, while a trait like
intelligence does serve as a reasonable and legitimate proxy for a
person’s abilities. 126 Here, the Court is suggesting that intellectual
disability differs from sex and race because that trait is often relevant
to one’s ability to perform or contribute to society, and therefore there
is less reason to be suspicious of laws that discriminate on the basis of
intellectual disability.
The remaining analysis of suspect classes discussed the Court’s
conclusion that the intellectually disabled are not “politically
120. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
121. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447–50.
122. See id. at 448 (“mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors
which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for”
treating intellectually disabled).
123. Id. at 442–47.
124. Id. at 441.
125. Id. (quoting Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686).
126. Id. at 440–41.
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powerless,” thereby failing to meet another one of the suspect class
factors. 127 The class has been able to successfully lobby legislatures to
enact legislation that protects their rights. 128 Because the group
protected its interests through the legislative process, the Court
reasoned that their political strength diminished the need for judicial
intervention on their behalf. 129 However, the Court did acknowledge a
history of invidious discrimination, but it reasoned that such history
alone does not justify labeling them as a suspect class. 130 While the
Court concluded that the intellectually disabled do not merit suspect
class status, in examining the discriminatory government action being
challenged in the case, the Court ultimately held that the denial of a
zoning permit for a home for the intellectually disabled failed even the
deferential rational basis test and, thus, violated equal protection. 131
The Court’s special attention to the intellectually disabled stems
from its implicit understanding that such persons are susceptible to, and
have historically suffered from, dehumanization. The Court implicitly
acknowledged that the city denied the zoning permit, in part, because
they viewed the intellectually disabled in a dehumanizing manner. One
of the reasons asserted by the city for denying the permit was that
elderly residents in the neighborhood were fearful of the intellectually
disabled. 132 In rejecting that as a basis for denying the permit, the Court
recognized that those fears are a result of “private biases,” 133 biases
reflective of dehumanization. Moreover, the city’s concern that
students of the junior high school would harass the intellectually
disabled 134 stems from viewing them in a dehumanizing manner, as
people who are physically and intellectually subhuman in nature. 135

127. Id. at 443–446.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 445 (negating “any claim that the mentally retarded are politically
powerless in the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of lawmakers”).
130. Id. at 446.
131. Id. at 450.
132. Id. at 448.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 449.
135. Id.
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As a dehumanized group, the intellectually disabled “are derogated,
tend to be avoided, and are often targets of discrimination.”136
Members of this class are so “severely dehumanized that they are not
even processed as human beings.” 137 People may feel disgust about the
intellectually disabled, and treat them accordingly. 138 The Court
implicitly recognized these considerations in concluding that the denial
of the zoning permit violated equal protection. Even under the rational
basis test, dehumanization of a class cannot be the basis for differential
treatment. Dehumanization cannot underlie any interests proffered by
the state for discriminating against the class. Thus, even under
deferential scrutiny, the Court ultimately concluded that the city’s
decision rested “on an irrational prejudice against the mentally
retarded . . . .” 139
D. Nonmarital Children as a Suspect Class
The concern with dehumanization can also help to explain why the
Court treats children born out of wedlock (nonmarital children) as a
suspect class. While the Court in Mathews v. Lucas ultimately upheld
a law discriminating against non-marital children under the Social
Security Act, the case is now understood to stand for the proposition
that laws discriminating against nonmarital children are subject to
intermediate scrutiny. 140
Nonmarital
children
have,
historically,
experienced
dehumanization by virtue of their “illegitimate” status and are a
“traditionally disfavored class in our society.” 141 Even the legal term
used to describe nonmarital children, illegitimate, is dehumanizing.
Being viewed as illegitimate is to treat the person as if he or she is less
than human and, thus, not entitled to the rights and privileges associated
with being a legitimate child or person.
The Court reasoned that nonmarital children are not defined by a
highly visible trait like race or gender, which could explain why
136. Laura Ruth Murry Parker, Less Than Human: Dehumanization Underlies
Prejudice Toward People with Developmental Disabilities, PURDUE UNIV. 6 (2015).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 5.
139. 473 U.S. at 450.
140. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
141. Id. at 520.
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“discrimination against illegitimates has never approached the severity
or pervasiveness of the historic legal and political discrimination
against women and Negroes.” 142
However, the Court also
acknowledged that nonmarital children have experienced societal
discrimination as a result of their status, and, thus, merit status as a
suspect class.
E Nonsuspect Classes
Dehumanization helps explain the cases in which the Court held a
group should not be deemed a suspect class. In San Antonio v.
Rodriguez, the Court concluded that the poor are not a suspect class. 143
In Rodriguez, the Court dealt with an equal protection challenge to the
State of Texas’ public school funding scheme. 144 The issue was
whether the poor constituted a suspect class deserving of special
judicial protection: “[w]e must decide, first, whether the Texas system
of financing public education operates to the disadvantage of some
suspect class . . . thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny.” 145 The
Court noted that the class alleging discrimination could be defined in
three different ways. The school funding scheme “might be regarded
as discriminating against: (1) ‘poor’ persons whose incomes fall below
some identifiable level of poverty or who might be characterized as
functionally ‘indigent;’ (2) those who are relatively poorer than others;
or (3) all those who, irrespective of their personal incomes, happen to
reside in relatively poorer school districts.” 146
The Court concluded that “[t]he Texas system does not operate to
the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect class,” 147 rejecting the notion
that any one of the three possible classes could qualify as suspect.
While the Court focused on the amorphous, difficult-to-define nature of
the possible classes bringing the lawsuit to reject the poor as a suspect
class, implicit within that analysis is the underlying belief that, wrongly
or rightly, the poor are not particularly susceptible to dehumanization.

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 506.
411 U.S. 1 (1976).
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 4.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 28.
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Poverty is not an immutable trait nor is it easily identifiable. As such, it
would not be easy to make the poor a target of dehumanization. Thus,
the amorphous nature of the class actually provides some level of
protection from dehumanization, which undermines the class’s need for
special judicial protection.
Similarly, the Court’s belief that the aged do not experience
systematic dehumanization may have been the basis for its decision in
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia. 148 In Murgia, a class of
police officers forced to retire upon turning fifty years old challenged
the constitutionality of a state mandatory retirement law. 149 The
threshold question for the Court was whether the discriminatory law
should be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. 150 The Court opined,
“[e]qual protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative
classification only when the classification impermissibly . . . operates
to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class.” 151
The Court refused to designate “a class of uniformed state police
officers over 50” as a suspect class, 152 reasoning that as a class, those
of an advanced age have not experienced a history of purposeful
unequal treatment like “those who have been discriminated on the basis
of race or national origin.” 153 Likewise, the Court found that those of
an advanced age have not been “subjected to unique disabilities based
on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their
abilities.” 154 Ultimately, the Court reasoned that old age does not define
a “‘discrete and insular group’ in need of ‘extraordinary protection from
the majoritarian political process.’” 155 Rather, old age simply “marks
a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our normal life span.”156
As such, the Court subjected the mandatory retirement statute to
review under the rational basis test and concluded that because
“physical ability generally declines with age,” it is rational for the State
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

427 U.S. 307 (1976).
427 U.S. at 309.
Id. at 312.
Id. at 312.
Id. at 313.
Id.
427 U.S. at 313.
Id.
Id. at 313–14.
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to “remove from police service those whose fitness for uniformed work
presumptively has diminished with age.” 157 For the Court, the
discrimination experienced by the aged is rationally based on reduced
capabilities as one ages, not because they are being thought of as less
than human. Thus, they do not require special protection by the courts.
III. IMMIGRANTS, DEHUMANIZATION, AND EQUAL PROTECTION
There is a clear historical pattern of dehumanization of immigrants
of all races throughout American history. As a dehumanized group,
immigrants, including undocumented immigrants, deserve special
protection against discriminatory laws as a protected suspect class.
A. Immigrants as a Suspect Class
The Court has long held that immigrants, specifically permanent
legal residents, are a suspect class. 158 In Graham v. Richardson, the
Court held that immigrants are a suspect class and state laws
discriminating against them should be subject to strict scrutiny.159
Although the Court did not explicitly use the term “suspect class” and
did not offer much analysis, the Court concluded “[a]liens as a class are
a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority” for whom
heightened judicial scrutiny is appropriate. 160
Immigrants are a “prime example” of a suspect class because of
their political powerlessness. By virtue of their inability to vote,
immigrants are unable to advance and protect their interests through the
political process. However, it is not readily clear that immigrants
unequivocally deserve status as a suspect class, as the other identified
indicia of “suspectness” do not neatly apply to immigrants. 161 For
instance, immigration status is not necessarily an immutable
characteristic. Immigrant status can change by applying for and being
granted U.S. citizenship, or by leaving the country. Therefore,
immigrants have greater control over their current immigration status.
157. Id. at 314.
158. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
159. Id. at 371–72.
160. Id. at 372.
161. See Simon, supra note 79, at 135 (“alienage, unlike race, does not socially
stigmatize in such a way that a person cannot readily strip herself of the bondage”).
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Additionally, immigrant status is not a highly visible physical trait, such
as race or gender.
Perhaps for these reasons, the suspect class status of immigrants
has several caveats. First, under Graham, only permanent resident
aliens are afforded suspect class status. 162 Nonimmigrant aliens and
undocumented immigrants are not considered suspect classes and laws
discriminating against them are subject to the rational basis test.
Second, permanent resident aliens are afforded suspect class status only
with respect to state laws that discriminate against them but are not
afforded suspect class status with respect to discriminatory federal
laws. 163 Third, even in challenging state laws, there are exceptions to
strict scrutiny analysis. 164 Laws discriminating against immigrants
with respect to government functions are subject only to rational basis
scrutiny. 165
Commentators critique this varying treatment of immigrants under
equal protection. 166 Some contend that all laws discriminating against
immigrants, whether federal or state, should be subject to strict
scrutiny. 167 The fragmented treatment of immigrants under the suspect
class doctrine would be better informed by considering
dehumanization.
The concern with dehumanization suggests that immigrants should
be considered a suspect class whether the law discriminating against
them is a state or federal law. The federal government’s “plenary
power” over immigration should not provide a license to dehumanize
immigrants. Moreover, concerns with dehumanization suggest that, of
all the various kinds of immigrants or aliens, laws that discriminate
against undocumented immigrants deserve the highest level of scrutiny
because undocumented immigrants are highly susceptible to
dehumanization.
162. See Karen Nelson Moore, Aliens and the Constitution, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV.
801, 815 (2013).
163. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 69, 83 (1976).
164. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 646–49 (1973).
165. Id.
166. See Jenny-Brooke Condon, Equal Protection Exceptionalism, 69 RUTGERS
U.L. REV. 563 (2017).
167. Victor Romero, The Congruence Principle Applied: Rethinking Equal
Protection Review of Federal Alienage Classifications After Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Peña, 76 OR. L. REV 425, 429 (1997).
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B. The Case for Undocumented Immigrants as a Suspect Class
In Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court addressed the status of
undocumented immigrants in analyzing a Texas statute barring
undocumented immigrant children from attending public schools.168
The Court struck down the law, implicitly treating undocumented
immigrant children as a protected class. 169
However, the Court distinguished undocumented immigrant
children from undocumented immigrant adults. 170 The Court reasoned
undocumented immigrant adults cannot be given suspect class status
because their “presence in this country in violation of federal law is not
a ‘constitutional irrelevancy.’” 171 States may discriminate against
undocumented immigrants whose “very presence within the U.S. is the
product of their own unlawful conduct.” 172 Undocumented children,
on the other hand, have little control over their status and many of them
did not have any choice in entering the U.S. without authorization.173
Thus, barring undocumented immigrant children from public school
imposes an unconstitutional “discriminatory burden on the basis of a
legal characteristic over which children can have little control.” 174
While the Court in Plyler humanizes undocumented immigrant
children, it dehumanizes undocumented immigrant adults. The Court
declared that undocumented immigrant adults “should be prepared to
bear the consequences” for entering into the United States “by stealth
and in violation” of U.S. laws. 175 Effectively, the Court stated that
undocumented adults deserve discriminatory treatment because of their
undocumented status.
If the Court views the suspect class doctrine as specially concerned
with the dehumanization of social groups, then undocumented
immigrants would have a very strong case for being given protected
168. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
169. Id. at 223–24 (“In determining the rationality of Section 21.031, we may
appropriately take into account its costs to the Nation and to the innocent children
who are its victims.”).
170. Id. at 220.
171. Id. at 223.
172. Id. at 219.
173. Id. at 220.
174. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220.
175. Id.
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status. 176 Status as undocumented is the basis for which they are
dehumanized and why they consequently suffer from invidious
discrimination. Dehumanization of undocumented immigrants is not
merely exacerbated by their status as “illegals,” but, their status itself is
inherently dehumanizing. 177
Being thought of as an “illegal” is thoroughly dehumanizing.
When thought of as an “illegal,” it is as if the undocumented
immigrant’s very essence is one marked by illegality. Such thinking
treats undocumented immigrants as if they are not truly human, but
subhuman. People who see undocumented immigrants through the lens
of “illegality” believe that undocumented immigrants should be treated
inhumanely, as if they deserve it for being “illegal.”
Being perceived as “illegal” is even more insidious than being
deemed a criminal. Criminals are perceived as deserving of due
process. A person who is “illegal,” however, must be eradicated
altogether because their very existence is a threat to law and order. For
this reason, “illegals” are worse than those who commit crimes:
“illegals” are themselves the crime.
Being “illegal” is coextensive with being subhuman. Assigning
subhuman characteristics to undocumented immigrants is far too easy.
Undocumented immigrants are depicted as diseases or disease carriers.
They are called “wetbacks,” a derogatory term deriving from the fact
that many undocumented immigrants had to wade or swim in the Rio
Grande River to cross into the United States. 178 The use of the term is
akin to viewing undocumented immigrants as fish. Clearly associated
with fishing, the term “catch and release” describes the policy of
detaining undocumented immigrants and then immediately releasing
them from custody. 179

176. Kteily et al., supra note 5, at 25 (“Groups occupying positions of
particularly low status in society . . . might be most subject to blatant
dehumanization”).
177. See id. (“blatant dehumanization is not only exacerbated by low status but
is in fact dependent on it.”).
178. Stacy Sullivan, We Shouldn’t Take the Bait on ‘Catch and Release,’ ACLU
(July 20, 2018, 2:45 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/immigrantsrights-and-detention/we-shouldnt-take-bait-catch-and-release.
179. See id.
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Undocumented immigrants need extraordinary protection from the
political process. They are “politically powerless” 180 because they
cannot vote and, as a class, they are highly vulnerable to
dehumanization. 181 Unfortunately, the Court’s reasoning in Plyler
supports the dehumanization of undocumented immigrant adults.182
The Court implied that, by choosing to come to the United States
illegally, undocumented immigrants deserve the discriminatory
treatment inflicted by the government. 183 However, that logic is
arguably the result of a dehumanized perception of undocumented
immigrants.
In a political climate where a class of people, such as
undocumented immigrants, are dehumanized, negative action against
them does not deserve judicial deference. When the government
explicitly engages in dehumanization, whether at the state or federal
level, any action taken against immigrants should be deemed suspect
and subject to rigorous judicial scrutiny. The federal government’s
plenary power should not be the basis for permitting dehumanizing and
discriminating treatment of immigrants.
Dehumanization is the hallmark of irrationality and arbitrariness.
As shown in the 2015 study discussed above, when the government
dehumanizes a group, such conduct is driven by disgust, anger, and
other emotions triggered by dehumanization. 184 Policy-making based
on heightened emotions triggered by dehumanization deserves deep
judicial skepticism. 185
CONCLUSION
This article argues that we need to incorporate the concept of
dehumanization into the equal protection suspect class analysis. Failing
to consider the central role of dehumanization in the subordination of
180. See Condon, supra note 166, at 598 (“Immigrants’ inability to vote renders
them particularly vulnerable to . . . discrimination and marginalization . . .”).
181. See generally Utych, supra note 3.
182. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220 (arguing undocumented immigrant adults “who
elect to enter our territory by stealth and in violation of our law should be prepared to
bear the consequences, including, but not limited to, deportation.”).
183. Id.
184. See Utych, supra note 3, at 3.
185. See id.
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vulnerable groups when determining a suspect class is fundamentally
flawed. Understanding that the equal protection doctrine is concerned
with preventing invidious discrimination against groups susceptible to
dehumanization provides a strong justification for protecting
immigrants, including undocumented immigrants, as a suspect class.
Immigrants have a long history of being subject to dehumanization.
Moreover, undocumented immigrants are highly susceptible to
dehumanization because they are labeled as “illegals.” For these
reasons, immigrants of any immigration status merit suspect class
protections. The concept of dehumanization also helps clarify issues,
such as how race-conscious affirmative action programs should be
treated under equal protection.
Dehumanization is a process that overlaps with, but is not identical
to, discrimination. Discrimination is the unequal treatment of similarly
situated groups. However, not only can laws discriminate against a
class without dehumanizing that class, but discriminatory laws do not
necessarily treat a class of people as subhuman. Because affirmative
action programs that discriminate in the college admissions process do
not dehumanize whites, the argument for strict scrutiny is diminished.
Only discrimination coupled with dehumanization fundamentally
implicates the core values and concerns of equal protection.
Since Brown, the equal protection doctrine has been implicitly
concerned with the harms of dehumanization to vulnerable groups.
That concern now should be made explicit by incorporating the concept
of dehumanization into equal protection suspect class analysis.
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